Who remains “safe” in the elections of the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA)?
For years, voters in CTA elections have clearly witnessed an unavoidable reality:
Within the current electoral system, not everyone is bound by the same standards and the same level of scrutiny.
In past elections and the handling of related disputes, the following scenarios have repeatedly emerged:
The first scenario is “clear accusations but no investigation.”
In some election cycles, accusations against candidates or incumbent officials have met the basic requirements—written complaints, a timeline, witnesses, or technical doubts—but the election commission has not initiated an independent investigation as required by law. Instead, it has shelved the matter with excuses such as “still under evaluation,” “insufficient evidence,” or “not accepted,” ultimately leaving it unresolved.
The second scenario is “prolonged disputes but no conclusion.”
Some disputes involving procedural fairness, resource usage, technical systems, or campaign practices have been repeatedly raised in multiple election cycles, yet no public conclusion has been reached, and no precedent has been established for subsequent handling. This “inconclusive state” objectively equates to the assumption that problems can be resolved over time.
The third scenario involves “significantly different treatment standards depending on the target.”
For ordinary candidates and grassroots runners, minor procedural flaws or inappropriate expressions often result in swift warnings, penalties, and even direct disqualification.
However, when issues target the Chief Justice or regional councilors with significant political influence, similar or even more serious problems are often handled with “high caution” and “discretion.”
These phenomena are not isolated incidents but recurring patterns across different times, regions, and elections.
Therefore, this is not merely a misjudgment by individual staff members, nor a random deviation from a single event, but rather a long-standing structural protection mechanism—in which relationships, status, and influence are effectively placed above the rules.
The Chief Justice and regional councilors are the core nodes in this network of power and relationships.
When oversight truly targets these nodes, the election commission often chooses to avoid key issues and delay procedural processes, ultimately rendering oversight merely a formality.
Voters are not unaware of these facts.
What’s truly disappointing isn’t that the system has had problems in the past, but rather that these problems have repeatedly surfaced yet failed to be openly discussed, effectively corrected, and responsibly resolved. Doesn’t this itself demonstrate the absurdity of the electoral system?